the Court held that there is no speech or debate privilege barring the introduction of evidence of the legislative acts of a state legislator in a federal criminal prosecution.' The Court found that the language and legislative history of Rule 501 revealed that such a privilege is not an established part of the federal common law and therefore is not applicable through the Rule. The Court also concluded that principles of federalism did not compel the privilege.
8
In Trammel, the Court balanced the "right to every man's evidence" 9 against a broad spousal privilege, and in Gillock, it balanced the right to enforce federal criminal statutes against the legislative privilege. The Court limited or rejected evidentiary privileges in these cases because it viewed the privileges as unduly hampering legitimate law enforcement efforts. The Court's promotion of the federal interest in criminal prosecutions indicates that it is concerned with facilitating the trial of persons charged with federal crimes at the expense of privileges designed to promote socially desirable conduct. The decision in Trammel achieved a restructuring of the law of marital privilege although 1 "[The privilege of a witness.. .Shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
2 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980) . S. 74, 78 (1958) .
4 100 S. Ct. at 914.
5 100 S. Ct. 1185 Ct. (1980 . 6Id. at 1194. 7 Id. at 1190. 8 Id. at 1193.
9 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) .
the Court failed to fashion a rule completely consistent with sound policy. The decision in Gillock sacrificed the important policy of promoting state legislators' independence to the federal interest in the conviction of criminals.
II. TRAMMEL v. UNITED STATES
By vesting the testimonial privilege solely in the witness spouse, the Court in Trammel rid itself of a rule which did not advance the ends it was theoretically designed to promote. It refused, however, to seize the opportunity to update completely the law of marital privilege by holding that only a privilege protecting confidential marital communications would be retained.
A. FACTS AND HOLDING
Prior to a trial on a narcotics indictment, Otis Trammel moved to sever his case from that of his two codefendants, asserting his claim to a privilege to prevent his wife, an unindicted co-conspirator, from testifying against him.' 0 The district court denied the motion after a hearing at which Trammel's wife was called as a government witness under a grant of use immunity and at which she testified that her cooperation with the government was based on assurances that she would be given lenient treatment." The district court ruled that she could testify in support of the government's case to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of a third person. Rules of privilege are substantive laws designed to influence the conduct of individualsas Unlike rules of exclusion which guard against unreliable, prejudicial, or misleading evidence, they do not aid in the discovery of truth. Instead, they serve to r rotect interests and relationships that society 100 S. Ct. at 910-11. The history of the privilege not to testify against one's wife or husband is involved.., in a tantalizing obscurity. That it existed by the time of Lord Coke is plain enough, but of the precise time of its origin, as well as the process of thought by which it was reached, no certain record seems to have survived.
What is a little odd is that it comes into sight about the same time as the disqualification of husband and wife to testify on one another's behalf..., for the two have no necessary connection in principle, and yet they travel together, associated in judicial phrasing, from almost the beginning of their recorded journey. Id. at 211.
2 Long since abandoned are the medieval jurisprudential canons which necessitated a privilege against adverse spousal testimony: the common law rule of incompetency that excluded the testimony of interested parties to a lawsuit, 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2227, and the idea that the husband and wife were "two souls in one flesh," E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6B (1628) [Vol. 71
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deems of sufficient importance to justify the suppression of facts necessary to the adjudicatory process. 3 1 Since the protection ensured by the testimonial privilege frustrates the working of the fundamental principle the Court has articulated that "the public has a right to every man's evidence, ' ' " privileges must be strictly construed.33 Only in the rare instance when the privilege serves a transcendent public good will a court thrust aside the allimportant search for evidence.34 Neither the ancient nor the modem social policies justify the retention of the privilege against adverse testimony by either spouse, except in the area of confidential communications.
The confidential marital communications privilege provides that communications in private between husband and wife are assumed to be confidential unless the subject of the discussion or the circumstances belie that assumption.35 If a third person, other than a child who is too young to understand, is present to the knowledge of the communicating spouse, the communication is not privileged. 36 In order to encourage free communication, the communicating spouse is the holder of this privilege.
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Trammel, however, did not deal with a privilege protecting confidential marital communications. It dealt only with the privilege to refuse to testify adversely, which protects communications made in the presence of third parties. The Court properly discarded the rule that the testimony of one spouse against the other is barred unless both consent by using its authority under Rule 501.
Congress enacted Rule 501 to allow the courts flexibility in developing the law of privilege' in cases such as Trammel, which require the re-examination of outmoded social policies. Moreover, the Court in Hawkins was careful to point out that its decision was not meant to "foreclose whatever changes in the rule [ 393, 404 (1975) .
"51 00 S. Ct. at 912.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Furthermore, many authorities have criticized the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
52
Wigmore labelled it "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice," 53 while McCormick denounced it as "an archaic survival of a mystical religious dogma.
' ' Both the Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute's 1942 Model Code of Evidence rejected a rule vesting in the defendant the right to exclude adverse spousal testimony, and advocated the privilege only for confidential marital communications.55 Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws called the rule of not requiring one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal action "a sentimental relic" and advised limiting the privileges to confidential communications between the spouses.5
The rule vesting the witness spouse with the privilege to refuse to testify adversely may advance the stated goal of avoidance of dissension in the marital relationship.
5 7 However, it does not encourage and strengthen a married couple's private relationship. The privilege protecting confidential marital communications serves this latter goal because the full disclosure of private thoughts and feelings between spouses helps to achieve the trust and confidence necessary to a healthy marriage. L. REV. 1353 L. REV. , 1370 L. REV. -71 (1973 . Marital dissension may be avoided if the witness spouse refuses to testify against his defendant spouse. However, in those cases in which the witness spouse chooses to testify, like Trammel, marital dissension is not avoided. McCormick notes that "family harmony is nearly always past saving when the spouse is willing to aid the prosecution." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66, at 145. The Court itself admits that "[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 100 S. Ct. at 913. of privacy when they converse in front of other people. The need for evidence in federal criminal trials is too great to allow a sweeping privilege which shields communications made when third parties are known to be present. M 
A. FACTS AND HOLDING
Edgar Gillock, a Tennessee state senator, was indicted on federal charges that he accepted money for the use of his public office to block the extradition of a criminal defendant from the state and that he had agreed to introduce state legislation to enable certain individuals to obtain master electricians' licenses which they had failed to obtain through existing processes.
6 ' Before trial, the dis-" Unlike the privileges between attorney and client, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § § 87-97, physician and patient, id. at § § 98-105, and priest and penitent, id. at § 77, the testimonial privilege protects not only private communications, but permits the exclusion of spousal testimony about communications made with no expectation of privacy. Id. at § 66.
59 Reutlinger, supra note 57, at 1370-71.
60 100 S. Ct. 1185 Ct. (1980 . 61 100 S. Ct. at 1187. The government's offer of proof charged him with soliciting money in exchange for using his influence as a state senator to block the extradition of a fugitive from Illinois. Id. at 1188. The government offered to prove that Gillock appeared at the extradition hearing, reviewed the extradition papers, questioned the [Vol. 71 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES trict court granted the senator's motion to suppress all evidence relating to his legislative activities, holding that Gillock had an evidentiary privilege cognizable under Rule 501.62 The district court equated the senator's privilege with that granted members of both houses of Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution and concluded that it prohibited the introduction of evidence of the senator's legislative acts and his underlying motivations. 6a The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a divided vote affirmed the district court in its protection of the privilege.6 hearing officer about the propriety of extradition on a misdemeanor charge, and requested an official opinion from the Tennessee Attorney General on the subject. Id. Furthermore, the government stated that it intended to introduce at trial the transcript of a telephone call during which Gillock declared that he could have blocked the extradition proceedings by exerting pressure on the extradition hearing officer who had appeared before Gillock's senate judiciary committee on a budgetary matter. Id The government also indicated that it would prove that Gillock attended a meeting of the senate judiciary committee where the extradition hearing officer presented his department's budget request. Id Next, the government offered proof that Gillock used his influence to assist four individuals in obtaining master electrician's licenses. Id. at 1188-89. The prosecution indicated that it would offer evidence that Gillock fixed a contingent fee of $5000 per person, to be refunded if Gillock were unsuccessful. Id. at 1189. The government offered to prove that Gillock introduced legislation providing for reciprocity among states in licensing of electricians, and made statements on the floor of the senate in support of the bill. Id. The government sought to show that when opposition to the bill was voiced by union representatives, Gillock replied that he could not withdraw the bill because he had accepted fees for introducing it. Id. The government also intended to prove that Gillock moved to override the Governor's veto of the legislation. The Gillock Court implied that a speech or debate privilege for state legislators was less tenable than the executive privilege rejected in United States v. Nixon (Nixon I).' Nixon I, however, can be distinguished from Gillock. The Court denied the executive privilege in Nixon I because the President claimed an "absolute, unqualified.., privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances." ' 6 The Court balanced the "generalized assertion" of executive privilege against the "inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. 
